Abstract--This work presents a methodology for forward electricity contract price projection based on market equilibrium and social welfare optimization. In the methodology supply and demand for forward contracts are produced in such a way that each agent (generator/load/trader) optimizes a risk adjusted expected value of its revenue/cost. When uncertainties are represented by a discrete number of scenarios, a key result in the paper is that contract price corresponds to the dual variable of the equilibrium constraints in the linear programming problem associated to the optimization of total agents´ welfare. Besides computing an equilibrium contract price for a given year, the methodology can also be used to compute the evolution of the probability distribution associated to a contract price with a future delivery period; this an import issue in quantifying forward contract risks. Examples of the methodology application are presented and discussed.
I. INTRODUCTION
E lectricity markets presents a great level risk due to spot prices uncertainty and volatility.
Volatility in electricity spot prices occurs in the short, medium and long-term and affects the cash flow of market agents who sell/buy energy in the wholesale market.
Short-term volatility is basically due to equipment (generators and transmission) failure, fuel availability, uncertainties in renewable energy production, fuel price and daily temperature. In medium and long-term periods, volatility in spot prices is due to uncertainty in hydrological conditions (in system with large reservoirs), demand growth, structural changes in the electricity generation sector and so on. Figure 1 shows the hourly spot price on a randomly selected day in the PECO zone of the PJM power market [1] . PJM is a predominantly thermal system [2] and, as a result, spot prices vary widely along the day.
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Now consider a predominantly hydro system with large reservoirs, such as Brazil [3] . Spot prices in Brazil [4] are strongly correlated to the amount of water stored in the main hydro plant´s reservoirs, as shown in Figure 3 . Notice how short-term price volatility is small, but medium to long-term volatility is huge. One way to tablish future/ hallenge for ge amework is to ptimize their re nancial risk. In this paper w ectricity contra e designing of The remainde ection II we pr arketing for gether with th own that comp e computed t scusses extens esents applica ectricity marke mmarized. 
Weight , is a risk aversion parameter for the generator and load. For a given contract price , generators sell contract amount associated to , given by:
Likewise, for given a contract price loads buy contract amount associated to , given by ( ) = ( , ) (6) Competitive equilibrium in the contract market corresponding to a pair ( , ) of price and energy amount such that is the solution of both supply (4) and demand curve (5) associated to price : = ( ) = ( ) (7) In equation (7) is the future/forward equilibrium contract price, reflecting agent expectations about market conditions in the contract delivery date.
When uncertainties are represented by a discrete number of scenarios, using Rockafellar´s representation of [8] , implies that problems (5)-(6) correspond to linear programming problems, parametrized by the price . For a fix price the optimality conditions for problems (5) and (6) corresponds to a linear system of equality/inequality equations. However, when is considered as a variable the resulting system of equality/inequality equations become nonlinear due to products involving contract price and energy amount. This means that in principle computation of the competitive equilibrium price in the contract market requires solving a system of nonlinear equality/inequality equations. In the next section we will show that this equilibrium can be found through the resolution of a linear programing problem which corresponds to the welfare maximization of both agents.
III. EQUILIBRIUM PRICE COMPUTATION IN THE CONTRACT MARKET AND WELFARE MAXIMIZATION
We start this section by observing that as the terms × and × in revenues equations for generators and loads are not random, expected value and properties [9] , imply that:
× is equal to the revenue associated to contract selling. The other term corresponds to the negative of the costs in the spot market associated to contract energy delivering. Thus (8) corresponds to the seller´s surplus. On the other hand, (9) corresponds to contract revenue in the spot market subtracted by the cost of purchasing it ( × ) which is equal to the buyer´s surplus.
Supposing that uncertainties are represents by a discrete number of scenarios, Rockafellar´s representation of CVaR [8] and (8) imply that problem (5) can be written as: (8) is nonlinear. Performing a transformation, it can be rewritten as a linear programming problem:
s.t. Dual variables:
Likewise, problem (6) with transformation above can be written as: net revenue of load in the spot market in scenario Now suppose that there is a price which corresponds to equilibrium, that is: = ( ) = ( ) Optimality conditions for problems (11) at , with price , can be written as:
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